Makers of modern strategy pdf free download
OO Paris, Charles Singer Oxford, ; repr. New York, , II, only to be brought to a halt by the civil wars. When the work was resumed under Henry IV and Sully, the Dutch were beginning to contest the primacy of the Italians in this field, and French engineers like Errard de Bar-le-Duc were available to replace the foreigners.
But to Galileo is due the fundamental discovery that the trajectory of a projectile, for the ideal case that neglects such disturbing factors as air resistance, must be parabolic.
Upon these discoveries, worked out as steps in his ballistic investigation, later hands erected the structure of classical physics. The Royal Society of London received its charter at the hands of Charles II in r , while four years later, with the encouragement of Colbert, the French Academie Royale des sciences was born. In both of these organizations, dedicated as they were at their foundation to "useful knowledge," many investigations were undertaken of immediate or potential value to the army and navy.
Ballistic investigations, studies on impact phenomena and recoil, researches on improved gunpowder and the properties of saltpeter, the quest for a satisfactory means of determining longitude at sea: these, and many other subjects, preoccupied the members of both academies.
In both countries able navy and army men are found among the diligent members. In France especially the scientists were frequently called upon for their advice in technical matters pertaining to the armed forces. Antiquity was still the great teacher in all that concerned the broader aspects of military theory and the secrets of military genius. Without doubt the most important writing concerned with the art of war fell into two classes: the pioneer works in the field of international law; and the pioneer works of military technology.
Machiavelli had been the theorist for the age of unregulated warfare, but his influence was waning by the turn of the seventeenth century. Francis Bacon was perhaps his last illustrious disciple; for it is hard to find until our own day such unabashed advocacy of unrestricted war as can be found in certain of the Essays.
But by Bacon's time the reaction had set in. Men like Grotius were leading the attack against international anarchy and against a war of unlimited destructiveness. These founding fathers of international law announced that they had found in the law of nature the precepts for a law of nations, and their central principle, as Talleyrand put it once in a strongly worded reminder to Napoleon, was that nations ought to do one another in peace, the most good, in war, the least possible evil.
It is easy to underestimate the influence of these generous theories upon the actual realities of warfare, and to cite Albert Sorel's black picture of international morals and conduct in the period of the Old Regime. Actually the axioms of international law exerted an undeniable influence on the mode and manner of warfare before the close of the seventeenth century. These rules were known to contending commanders and were quite generally followed.
Such, for example, were the instructions concerning the treatment and exchange of prisoners; the condemnation of certain means of destruction, like the use of poison; the rules for the treatment of noncombatants and for arranging parleys, truces, and safe. The whole tendency was to protect private persons and private rights in time of war, and hence to mitigate the evils.
In the second class, that of books on military technology, no works had greater influence or enjoyed greater prestige than those of Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban, the great military engineer of the reign of Louis XIV. It was exerted subtly and indirectly through the memory of his career and of his example, and by the exertions and writings of a number of his disciples. Thanks to the work of scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who have been able to publish an appreciable portion of Vauban's letters and manuscripts, and to peruse and analyze the rest, we have a clearer understanding of Vauban's career and of his ideas than was possible to his eighteenth-century admirers.
He has increased in stature, rather than diminished, in the light of modern studies. We have seen the Vauban legend clarified and documented; we have seen it emended in many important points; but we have not seen it exploded. The Vauban legend requires some explanation. Why was a simple engineer, however skillful and devoted to his task, raised so swiftly to the rank of a national idol? Why were his specialized publications on siegecraft and the defense of fortresses sufficient to rank him as one of the most influential military writers?
Almost always they were the focal operations of a campaign: when the reduction of an enemy fortress was not the principal objective, as it often was, a 7 An eighteenth-century writer on the education of the nobility suggests that the five most important authors a student should study are Rohan, Santa Cruz, Feuquieres, Montecuccoli, and Vauban.
A number of spurious works, however, had appeared before his death, purporting to expound his methods of fortification. This was reprinted in and again in No carefully prepared editions were published until Sieges were far more frequent than pitched battles and were begun as readily as battles were avoided.
When they did occur, battles were likely to be dictated by the need to bring about, or to ward off, the relief of a besieged fortress. The strategic imagination of all but a few exceptional commanders was walled in by the accepted axioms of a war of siege. In an age that accepted unconditionally this doctrine of the strategic primacy of the siege, Vauban's treatises were deemed indispensable and his name was necessarily a name to conjure with.
Yet only a part of the aura and prestige that surrounded Vauban's name arose from these technical writings. Additional Information. Table of Contents. Cover Download Save contents. Title Page, Copyright pp. Table of Contents pp.
Acknowledgments pp. Introduction Peter Paret pp. Rothenberg pp. Palmer pp. Part Two: The Expansion of War. Napoleon and the Revolution in War Peter Paret pp. Jomini John Shy pp. Clausewitz Peter Paret pp. Craig pp. Create Alert Alert. Share This Paper. Background Citations. Citation Type. Has PDF. Publication Type. More Filters. War, Clausewitz and the Trinity. Today, the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz are employed almost ubiquitously in strategic studies, military history, and defence literature, sometimes at length, at others only in passing.
Certain of his … Expand. Abstract : This monograph examines Chinese warfare and suggests that 3, years of Chinese military history have produced a distinctive and enduring Chinese way of war. While the art and science of … Expand. Abstract : This paper explores the hypothesis that although Clausewitz has been criticized for not specifically addressing naval warfare in his seminal work On War, Clausewitzian principles are in … Expand.
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